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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay provides an overview of some research that is in its early stages. 
The principal purpose of the authors is to understand whether, in a 
Continental European legal system such as the Italian one – traditionally 
led by a strong historical and normative vision of copyright (or author’s 
right) as natural right and nowadays influenced by the EU propertization 
trend – it is yet possible to foresee a different approach that is prone to 
interpreting the exclusivity of copyright in terms of monopoly.  
The latter approach, to some extent, might in fact be more relevant to 
restricting copyright protection by limiting the exclusive rights (ius 
excludendi alios) while supporting the public interest. Besides, the vision of 
“copyright as monopoly” seems in particular to play an overriding role 
within the digital context, where property is less apt in terms of the 
promotion and sharing of knowledge and, on the contrary, monopolistic 
jeopardy is sensibly flourishing. 
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Copyright as Monopoly: the Italian Fire under 
the Ashes1  
Roberto Caso and Giulia Dore 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This essay provides an overview of some research that is in its early 
stages. The principal purpose of the authors is to understand 
whether, in a Continental European legal system such as the Italian 
one – traditionally led by a strong historical and normative vision of 
copyright (or author’s right) as natural right and nowadays 
influenced by the EU propertization trend – it is yet possible to 
foresee a different approach that is prone to interpreting the 
exclusivity of copyright in terms of monopoly.  
The latter approach, to some extent, might in fact be more relevant 
to restricting copyright protection by limiting the exclusive rights 
(ius excludendi alios) while supporting the public interest. Besides, the 
vision of “copyright as monopoly” seems in particular to play an 
overriding role within the digital context, where property is less apt 
in terms of the promotion and sharing of knowledge and, on the 
contrary, monopolistic jeopardy is sensibly flourishing. 
The second paragraph illustrates the typical conflict between the 
copyright natural right model and the monopolistic approach to 
copyright, with an outlay of the comparative grounds in which it 
further develops referring to EU experiences and highlighting the 
trend for propertization in the EU. The third paragraph seeks to 
demonstrate how the model of copyright as monopoly, which has in 
Italy ancient and solid foundations from an economic and legal 
theoretical perspective, may represent a fine contemporary 
instrument for the present-day challenges of copyright law, with an 
irrefutable tie to the methodology of both comparative law and the 
economic analysis of law. A de iure condito argument is advocated, 
juxtaposing the canons of copyright as natural right and of 
                                                          
1 This working paper was presented and discussed at the Third Annual Private 
Law Consortium, July 6-7 2015, Centre for Intellectual Property Policy, McGill 
University, Faculty of Law. The authors wish to thank all speakers for their 
insightful comments and suggestions. Roberto Caso is author of the paragraphs 1, 
3 and 4, Giulia Dore is author of paragraph 2 and 5.  
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copyright as monopoly, but also offering some concrete examples 
of the interpretative outcomes and operative effects that each of the 
two visions generate. In the fourth paragraph, such considerations 
are promptly translated into the digital frame, where the 
monopolistic effects of copyright become even more obvious and 
pronounced, particularly with reference to the functioning of the 
digital exhaustion principle and the use of technological protection 
measures. Finally, with these latest concerns in mind, the last 
paragraph presents some provisional conclusions. 
 
 
2. Monopoly or property? 
 
The English copyright and continental authors’ rights systems have 
essentially developed around the revolutionary invention of the 
printing press, moving on to a legislative path that, departing from 
the booksellers’ privileges, led to the first copyright laws in the 
1700s. The printing revolution certainly established the foundation 
for the subsequent growth of the economics and concepts upon 
which public power shaped the law, which still represents the 
outcome of a balancing process that embraces opposing and often 
conflicting interests.  
These interests are, on the one hand, streamlining the individual’s 
exclusive rights to exploit his/her intellectual work, and, on the 
other hand, the wider interest of the public to access and use the 
work. Against this background, the necessary give and take between 
such divergent interests is achieved by imposing certain limits over 
the duration and scope of copyright. Moreover, exclusive rights also 
coexist with the lingering effectiveness of the public domain and so 
with a range of exceptions to the main rule of exclusivity. 
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However, the equally revolutionary advance of digital technology, 
which has been shaped in the same way as the printing revolution, if 
not with sturdier power and consequences, has undeniably 
disrupted such a layout of interests, as well as the overall structure 
of copyright laws in the Western tradition. Consequently, the public 
decision-maker has found him/herself headed for the inescapable 
task of reshaping the whole spectrum of interests, which in the first 
place requires reconsideration and amendment of the laws thus far 
promulgated in order to afford adequate protection to the works of 
the mind. 
During recent decades, copyright has undeniably undergone 
significant expansion [see Lessig, 2004]. The sphere of exclusivity 
has attracted new types of work, for example, software and 
databases, and new mechanisms of protection have been settled in 
order to encompass new ways of exploiting the work, such as the 
imposition of levies upon the selling of devices or the incorporation 
in the work itself of technological protection measures (TPMs). The 
expansion of copyright, however, characterizes a mutual trend for 
the Western tradition as a whole, to the extent that many 
commentators have discerned some kind of convergence between 
common and civil law systems [e.g. Goldstein 2001]. 
Noticeably the United States seems to have exerted some strain on 
the enlargement of copyright, from the international angle, by 
means of conventions and through its own national legislation [e.g. 
Litman, 2006]. Nevertheless, the European Union has gone even 
further, promoting an overall far-reaching protective scope, as in 
the case of the sui generis protection of the database. The same EU 
legislator makes such intent abundantly clear. For example, the 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of 
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copyright and related rights in the information society, in fact, 
establishes the highest level of protection (see recitals 4 and 9).2 
Both from a scholarly and case law standpoint, the picture appears 
far more compound. Countless scholars have criticized the 
unhindered expansion of copyright. The courts, on the other hand, 
have been vacillating, with some pronouncements in favour of 
strengthening copyright protection and others preferring a more 
definite copyright limitation. Either way, with regard to the 
augmentation or contraction of copyright protection, we cannot 
discard the role of theoretical models that have explored the nature 
and justification of copyright and intellectual property in general.  
As commonly understood, two main theories have been devised in 
this regard. One leads to the utilitarian model that considers 
exclusivity to be the basic instrument created by the State with the 
aim of incentivizing knowledge exchange; the other, on the 
contrary, hints at the doctrine of natural law, which favours 
copyright protection in terms of fair reward for the expenditure of 
creative labour. Indeed, although the assortment of theories is 
broader and has many leading to few more theoretical models, for 
the purpose of this article, we will be considering the two foremost 
above-mentioned theories.  
In an attempt to simplify these arguments, we will allege that the 
former approach is well identified with the word “monopoly”, while 
the latter nowadays is rather pigeonholed by the term “property” 
[cf. Moyse, 1998; Strowel, 1993, 77 ff.]. 
Use of the word “property” appears to be undeniably dominant, not 
only being used regularly in a general sense or in more focused 
discourses on copyright, but also resulting from the explicit 
reference to it made by legislators and other decision-makers in 
                                                          
2 See also Dir. 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (recital 
21). 
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their lexicon, both on domestic and international grounds, for 
example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) [e.g. 
Lemley, 2005], TRIPs and – at least from a constitutional 
perspective – the EU [e.g. Resta, 2011]. 
At the same time, one should not overlook that copyright law has 
its own peculiar features, which distinguish it both from a legal 
monopoly and from a right of property over tangible res. However, 
the inevitable rhetorical imprint of both terms in question plays an 
interesting and crucial role at the ideological, political and 
operational levels. 
Furthermore, influential scholarly sources emphasize how common 
law systems, especially those of the United States, are more prone to 
sharing the monopolistic vision, while the Continental structure of 
authors’ rights, as found in the Italian system, are largely inclined 
towards the natural right image. This is an oversimplification, largely 
caused by the dissimilar historical development featuring the 
common law copyright and the civil law droit d’auteur [e.g. Izzo, 
2010] respectively. Many authors have underlined that both visions 
may have coexisted and still exist against the two legal backgrounds, 
also explained by the legacy of disseminated ideas and attitudes that 
are common to the larger Western tradition [e.g. Goldstein, 2001, 3 
ff.; Ginsburg, 1990].  
Nonetheless, there is an element of truth even in this 
oversimplification. The monopolistic vision explains certain 
distinctive features of the normative structure of US copyright law, 
while the natural right pattern better describes the typical traits of 
Continental legislation, such as the Italian legge d’autore that is 
henceforth considered. The twofold claim of the monopoly and 
natural right schemes appears confirmed by their polyvalent use by 
legal interpreters. The naturalistic, proprietary and individualist 
approach serves as a means to justify the expansion of the 
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protection of copyright, but the metaphor of property may also be 
well cast to rationalize the limits of copyright [Lametti, 2012]. The 
same dual attitude appears to be equally pertinent to the utilitarian 
design. 
Nonetheless, in the view of the authors, especially with regard to 
the economic facets of copyright (for now leaving aside any 
consideration for the moral rights of the author), and particularly 
within the digital arena, the monopolistic vision appears to be a 
more suitable choice to define properly the perimeters of copyright 
exclusivity. The exclusive trait (monopoly) is indeed to be regarded 
as the instrument that the State creates to grant protection to 
copyright, not the intrinsic purpose of the law itself, which is 
instead the advancement of the learning and sharing of knowledge. 
Within this defined context, the core parameter for reference shall 
be the public domain [cf. Patterson, 1998, 443 ff.], while the 
monopoly of the exclusivity alias shall be the exception.  
As anticipated, this is a known perspective in the United States. The 
historical roots of the utilitarian view have been vastly explored and 
continue to be investigated. For the purposes of this paper, we will 
not review these arguments. The foremost aim of the present 
research is indeed to show how, even in a typical Continental 
system such as the Italian one, despite the normative framework 
that seems to be going in the opposite direction (see Article 17, 
paragraph 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union), the monopolistic theory of copyright is likely to make a 
significant contribution to the debate.  
Particularly in the digital era, the overriding power that arises from 
granting the exclusivity of rights may sensibly challenge the fragile 
equilibrium that legislators and courts have been trying to establish 
in balancing the opposing interests of all copyright players and 
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stakeholders. This appears even more plausible when such power is 
exercised with the strength and even armed force of technology.  
Moreover, even before the massive spread of digital technologies, 
the visualization of copyright as a monopoly has had relevant 
effects on the encroachment of innovation. Specifically, the 
Betamax decision of 1984 certainly represents a critical juncture 
[Samuelson, 2006]. The Court’s conclusions supported the inference 
that the manufacturers of devices, such as home video recorders 
that consumers use to record copyrighted works, are not liable to 
copyright infringement as far as such devices allow licit and 
commercially relevant uses that do not violate copyright [J. Band, A. 
J. McLaughlin, 1993; M. Burks, 1985; J. Lawrence, B. Timberg, 
1989; G. S. Lunney, 2002].  Furthermore, not only is their 
contributory (indirect) liability excluded, but users are also 
exempted as far as their use is for time shifting, with the fair use 
defence applying accordingly.3  
Nevertheless, the Betamax vision is not absolute. On other 
occasions, the Supreme Court has pronounced differently.4  To 
                                                          
3 In the arguments of Justice Stevens who delivered the opinion of the Court, the 
US constitutional IP clause operates as follows: “The monopoly privileges that 
Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a 
special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the 
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive 
control has expired.” Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984), 
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/case.html>. 
4 See, in particular, the Grokster decision by the Supreme Court, which certainly 
challenges the Betamax approach holding that “one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties”. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005), 380 F.3d 1154, 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/04pdf/04-480.pdf>. 
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such an extent, although some traces in the proprietary perception 
of copyright can be found in the US system, the monopolistic 
canons certainly prevail and have a clear impact on the entire 
development of its domestic law, even thanks to the influence 
played by economic analysis of the law on copyright theories. 
On the contrary, within the framework of the European Union, the 
constitutional normative approach is radically different and certainly 
influenced by the typically property-driven approach of the 
Continent. Article 17 paragraph 2 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, dedicated to the Right 
to property, declaims, in the English version, that “intellectual 
property shall be protected” [Resta, 2011; Sganga, 2015].  
Accordingly, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is 
creating copious case law on copyright. The emblematic questions 
posed by the digital era fuel the problem of balancing copyright 
with other fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression 
and information, the privacy and protection of personal data, but 
also the freedom to conduct business. A good example of this is 
provided by the Court’s judgment on the Promusicae case.5  Such 
urgings appear even more clear and explicit in the Scarlet decision 
and are then reaffirmed by the next CJEU ruling in the Netlog case,6 
and more recently in the UPC Telekabel decision [Dore, 2015].7 
                                                          
5 As the ECJ argues in respect to the necessary fair balance among rights, or more 
broadly the interests of the different parties involved in copyright questions or 
controversies, “it should be recalled that the fundamental right to property, which 
includes intellectual property rights such as copyright and the fundamental right 
to effective judicial protection constitute general principles of Community law 
[However], Member States must, when transposing the directives mentioned 
above, take care to rely on an interpretation of the directives which allows a fair 
balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community legal order” (at 62, 63 and 68). Case 275/06 Productores de Música 
de España (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU [2008] ECR I-271. 
6 The Court in that case made it clear that «the protection of the right to 
intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
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In brief, the constitutional normative context of the European 
Union visibly seems to be pushing, at least for what is declared in 
legislative acts and court rulings, for the propertization of copyright 
[Resta, 2011; Sganga, 2015]. The interpretative understanding of the 
EU Court of Justice deliberately speaks of the need to strike a fair 
balance among different fundamental rights and, by so doing, 
applies general criteria such as proportionality and reasonableness.  
Therefore, it is in the offing that there will be a renewal or 
reconsideration of the theory of copyright as a monopoly even 
within the European Union and its Member States. Indeed, in the 
view of the authors, this is more than plausible, at least with regard 
to the Italian context.  
 
 
3. Copyright as monopoly in the Italian literature 
 
The Italian Constitution of 1948 does not mention either copyright 
or the other intellectual property rights that include patents or 
trademarks. Consequently, copyright and, in turn, the related 
principle of striking a fair balance among all interests and rights 
applying to copyright matters, are otherwise indirectly referred to as 
other existing constitutional provisions.8  The applicable regulatory 
                                                                                                                               
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). There is, however, 
nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case-law to 
suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely 
protected» (at 42 and 43). Case C-360/10 Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) v. Netlog [2012] ECR I-0000. 
7 Case 314/ 12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH vs Constatin Film Verleih GmbH 
[2014] OJ C151/2. 
8 In particular, as the Italian Constitutional Court argued “it has to be observed 
that, given the public interest of both users and enterprises in that market, the 
interests of the authors of the works in question still matter, which the legislator 
considers to be of overriding importance […] it becomes essential to 
acknowledge the proprietary right [sic!] of the author of the work and his/her 
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framework is instead devised from the 1942 Italian Civil Code and 
in Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright 
and Neighbouring Rights, subsequently amended but never entirely 
and systematically reformed. 
In terms of copyright as a scientific discipline in Italy, traditionally 
professors of industrial law – a branch of commercial law – have 
taught it.9  Indeed, even considering this peculiar affiliation, Italian 
copyright literature has proved to be quite productive and wide-
ranging, with equal representation of natural law and utilitarian 
approaches to copyright [Auteri, 2012, 541]. Therein, some 
influential exponents of the Italian liberal economic theory have 
raised their voices against intellectual property, from 1700s 
illuminists to 1900s economists. Relatively recent contemporary 
works have expressly underlined such an important trend [Borghi, 
2003], in particular focusing on the thoughts of leading economist 
and politician Luigi Einaudi [Resta, 2011].  
                                                                                                                               
consequent exclusive right to exploit the work itself, although the law does not 
fail to afford adequate protection to other rights and interests by pursuing a fair 
balance among them all. This is a necessary balance that is shielded by the 
Constitution’s principles that concern the protection of freedom of art and 
science (Article 33), the defence of private property, which extends to intellectual 
works (Article 42), and the safeguarding of labour in any form, including 
intellectual creation (Article 35). Such a balance appears at the same time to be 
pursued through the promotion of artistic, literary and scientific outputs, to foster 
the full development of the human person (Article 3) and of culture (Article 9)”. 
Judgment No. 108/1995, at 9 and 10 [translation by the authors]. 
The strong bond between the protection of authors and of culture has been 
reaffirmed by the same Italian Constitutional Court on several occasions (see 
Italian Constitutional Court, judgments No. 241/1990; No. 361/1998), which as 
yet has not failed to take into adequate consideration the freedom to conduct 
business (Article 41). 
9 Recurrently, the subject of copyright law has been marginal: it may be imparted 
as an elective course or simply outlined in other courses. Similarly, the main 
textbooks and encyclopaedias are generally left to the experts in industrial law. 
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In a renowned 1940 essay, Einaudi reviewed his nineteenth-century 
precursor Francesco Ferrara to share his criticism of the so-called 
artistic and literary property [Einaudi, 1940]. Such criticism is indeed 
rather sweeping and, like Ferrara, Einaudi doubts the reasonability 
of an economic justification of copyright and patents. Hence, he 
promoted a drastic revision of the legislation in force, which should 
have aimed at reducing the scope and term of exclusivity, allowing 
everybody to reproduce and use the literary or artistic work when 
exclusivity had ended, by simply paying a fee. It is not by chance 
that Einaudi referred several rimes to the word “monopolio” 
(monopoly) to qualify the economic substance of intellectual and 
industrial property. 
Resuming the legal theory after the Second World War, in addition 
to the natural law doctrines of copyright that at first prevailed, 
distinct discourses based on a utilitarian perspective to intangible 
goods and the justification of copyright protection became 
increasingly noteworthy. In particular, the utilitarian approach is 
well portrayed by the thoughts of a great Italian law scholar, who 
also engaged with comparative law, namely Tullio Ascarelli. 
In the 1957 edition of his precious book on the theory of 
competition and immaterial goods, criticizing the typical approach 
of natural law to both copyright and patent, Ascarelli argued that 
the ultimate justification of exclusivity had to be located in the 
public interest, which is in fact fed by a proper limitation of 
exclusivity. Once the term exclusivity has expired, copyright works 
and inventions must be freely reproducible and exploitable by 
others. Such freedom properly and fully expresses the advancement 
of cultural and technical progress [Ascarelli, 1957, 244].10   
                                                          
10 Accordingly, so he discussed: “It seems to me that the justification of absolute 
rights towards intellectual creations lies precisely in the interest of promoting 
cultural or technical progress or to ensure that the best competitors prevail as the 
public consumers reputed most praiseworthy” [translation by the authors]. 
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With explicit regard to copyright, Ascarelli adds that the justification 
of copyright protection cannot be referred to the protection of 
labour, but instead, as it is with intangible goods in general, to the 
general interest of promoting cultural progress. In other words, 
there seems to be the opportunity to shield the economic protection 
of the work (as it would not make sense in terms of moral rights); 
on the other hand, it is essential to limit its duration and to confine 
it to those intellectual creations that are otherwise acknowledged as 
original works of the mind [Ascarelli, 1957, 598]. 
In contemporary times, Ascarelli’s theory is still somehow thriving, 
although with different shades and inferences, especially with regard 
to an understanding of exclusivity in an openly functional (yet 
utilitarian) view and in strict connection with the theory of 
competition. More specifically, nowadays the Italian scholarship 
appears quite sensible to theoretical approaches that consider the 
relevancy and uniqueness of the public interest [e.g. Ghidini, 2008]. 
Although with distinct perspectives, several authors criticize the 
excessive derivation of copyright protection, thus suggesting de jure 
condendo its severe limitations, or even the substitution of its typical 
mechanism (the exclusive right) with others, such as the pay-per-use 
model [Ricolfi, 2011; Ricolfi, 2014, Libertini, 2014]. 
Such renewed concerns for the public interest may effectively play 
an initially standing role in discussing copyright from a historical, 
comparative and explicitly economic standpoint, particularly in 
terms of economic analysis of law (hereafter EAL) [Pardolesi, 
Granieri, 2004; Colangelo, 2015]. Unmistakably, this favours the 
development of a methodology that is at the same time subject to 
certain ideological and political interpretations. For instance, the 
EAL approach is often identified with the liberal vision that is 
typical of the Chicago school, which is recurrently interpreted as 
being in favour of a strong intellectual rights protection. However, 
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it is known that there are other specific ideological lines of EAL 
that are not exactly ascribable to the above-mentioned model.  
In a broader sense, criticism of the unlimited expansion of 
copyright, in fact, converges into a distinct slant that contrasts with 
legal positivism and formalism, while being inclined to 
consideration of a larger number of factors and dynamics – 
ideological, political, social and ethical – that move and influence 
intellectual property. However, such a modernized and multifaceted 
approach to the investigation of intellectual property and copyright 
matters still appears not quite ready to be translated into a 
demarcated and thorough concept of public interest. 
 
 
4. Copyright as monopoly in the digital environment 
 
The strong property-driven vision of copyright leads to a number of 
important conclusions. 
First, either one shares the idea that intellectual property rights 
are numerus clausus, thus substantiating in patents, copyright, 
trademarks and other sui generis forms of protection that the 
exclusivity of the rights there embodied is capable of expanding 
within each sphere of protection and consequently extending the 
latter to new types of work, namely, software. Therefore, some have 
argued that the list of works relating to copyright subject matters is 
not absolute but indeed open to going beyond the traditional realm 
of literature, music, figurative arts, architecture, theatre and cinema 
[Auteri, 2012, 547]. 
In addition, the dominant interpretative approach to diritto 
d’autore, contrarily to the US copyright, furthermore sustains that the 
number of entitlements that the right-holder may exercise is wide 
open and therefore not limited to the right to reproduce, distribute, 
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perform in public and communicate the copyright work [e.g. Spada, 
2012, 31]. According to this interpretation, even before EU 
Directive No. 1992/100 – then codified Directive No. 2005/115 – 
granted exclusive status to the right of renting and lending the work, 
denying the applicability of the exhaustion right principle, such an 
entitlement was already envisaged as one of the right-holder’s 
privileges. 
Finally, whether we consider copyright to be a property right, 
exclusivity is the main standard, regardless of which restraint we 
may think is applicable. In particular, according to the predominant 
construal, exceptions and limitations must be interpreted strictly. 
Such a conclusion appears to be confirmed by the current reading 
of the three-step test rule of an international and UE law substance. 
With these premises in mind, the risk of overprotecting 
copyright is real and made even more concrete by the occurrence 
that in the digital age copyright is enforced by contract, by means of 
proprietary licence, and by technology protection measures, widely 
endorsed by international and domestic legislations. 
A good example of the consequence of such an interpretative 
trend is represented by neutralization of the exhaustion principle 
within the digital context [Perzanowski, Schultz, 2010; Spedicato, 
2015]. Such neutralization implies the disappearance of secondary 
markets, for example, with regard to the online distribution of e-
books through user licence agreements, which are clearly distinct 
from traditional sale even by their appearance (when they began 
with “this is not a sale, but a license”) [Elkin-Koren, 2011]. 
Moreover, such a contractual tool disproves resale, endowment and 
lending by the licensor. If the content of the licence is enforceable, 
the monopolistic effects of copyright become overwhelming, clearly 
shaping a serious endangerment of ancillary markets. Consequently, 
in the digital dimension it is unlikely to envision the resale of used e-
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books, or the endowment of certain books to libraries – even 
loaning between private individuals. Furthermore, the extension of 
monopoly not only has economic effects, but in turn, it echoes over 
the right of information – with fewer available low-priced or gratis 
books – and over privacy, given that the copyright-holder will 
always maintain control of his/her books. 
By the way, it is worth noting that when overt implications of 
competition law are both marked and perceptible, the ECJ has also 
denoted the monopolistic consequences of copyright although 
explicitly referring to the word monopoly. We may recall the 
UsedSoft case of 2012, which dealt with the exhaustion of the right 
of distribution with regard to the selling of digital copies of software 
distributed over the Internet.  
On this matter, the ECJ in fact explained that “the objective of 
the principle of the exhaustion of the right of distribution of works 
protected by copyright is, in order to avoid partitioning of markets, 
to limit restrictions of the distribution of those works to what is 
necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual 
property concerned […] a restriction of the resale of copies of 
computer programs downloaded from the internet would go 
beyond what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of 
the intellectual property concerned”.  
Another good example to explain the broad extension of 
monopolistic effects is provided by the application of technology-
protection measures to the devices that allow the content of the 
copyright work to be played. In particular, we refer to the instance 
in which videogames right-holders often manufacture the device 
(console like Sony Playstation) that is required to use them. The 
manufacturer makes the device interoperable only with its own 
videogames by implementing TMPs to the latter. According to the 
manufacturer, TMPs find their validation in copyright law, which 
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also allows their enforcement, by granting manufacturers the power 
to sue those who modify the hardware in order to make the device 
interoperable. However, the aim of the technology measure is not 
to protect videogames from piracy, but rather to extend market 
power (from the market of devices to the market of their 
corresponding goods) and to compart the market (TMPs can in fact 
discriminate prices over distinct markets through regional codes). 
The effect is not merely economic, as a postponement of the 
market as a whole, but it also affects property over the device, 
considered stricto sensu as a property over tangible goods, and 
certainly impairs the freedom to modify technology. The liberty to 
interact and even modify technology indeed represents an 
indisputable and countless source of innovation. 
The model of copyright as a monopoly challenges the dominant 
Italian interpretative trend. According to this approach, the public 
domain is the standard, while exclusivity is the exception, and the 
exception must be interpreted restrictively. More specifically, few 
distinctive consequences occur. First, only the legislator has the 
power to grant new exclusive rights. Without express legislative 
acknowledgment, any other privilege that the right-holder may claim 
will not be enforced in court. Second, exclusivity is not the only 
instrument of protection for the right-holders, since other means of 
equal importance are the pay-per-use domain based on a liability 
rule, or the automatic imposition of a charge that corresponds to a 
percentage of the price of sale of devices that play and record 
copyright works. Third, free uses, named exceptions and limitations 
in the European Union are subject to analogical interpretation. The 
three-step test is a general standard and, like fair use, it should 
permit the striking of a fair balance among different interests. 
Such an interpretive framework allows the above-illustrated cases 
to be solved with regard to digital exhaustion and technological 
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measures that are implemented into videogames and related devices. 
Moreover, the principle of exhaustion articulates a general rule of 
protecting the public domain, meanwhile condensing the 
monopolistic influence of copyright. It applies to the digital context 
without an explicit legislative acknowledgment. If the legislator 
wanted to exclude such a principle from the digital worlds, he or 
she should have said so expressly. 
Furthermore, when technical measures are employed to extend 
the market power and to compartmentalize the markets, a misuse of 
the power to apply TMPs occurs, which has nothing to do with the 
protection of copyright works. This is the main reason why the 
freedom to modify devices in order to extend and implement their 
functionality and interoperability should be allowed and indeed 
promoted. 
Copyright as a monopoly scheme has historical and economic 
underpinning; it develops for want of legislation. It is a legal artefact 
that was created relatively recently, with the result of a 
transformation from monopoly privileges, granted to some, into a 
right of exclusivity that is born to concern all authors of original 
works of the mind.  
Moving from privileges to exclusive rights, copyright has not lost 
its economic substance, namely the fact of being a legal monopoly. 
Economists see legal monopoly as one of the instruments used by 
public power to regulate the production of knowledge. There are, 
however, other tools that target the same need, such as the tutelage, 
direct public procurement of information, prizes and rewards, but 
also incentives aimed at supporting the making and spreading of 
information. Additionally, digital technology has freed creative 
energy, with the exception of precise economic inducements. 
While economists deliberate over the effective significance of 
incentives on the development of copyright, exclusivity 
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unquestionably ontologically contrasts with competition. The 
incentivizing effect has to face the inexorable constraint of 
competition – a risk that appears greatly augmented when one 
considers that information is intrinsically cumulative and 
incremental. Major risks also seem to arise where intellectual 
property interacts with network externalities and the influence of 
standards. Truly, without an extensive public domain there is very 
little room for making and sharing knowledge, which is, and should 
remain, the core aim of copyright. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In This essay is not about finding a way to amend and reform 
copyright in order to make it more applicable to the digital context. 
There is a vast body of literature on this subject. Rather, the present 
work probes the significance of applying the strong traditional 
natural right and proprietary visions of copyright and attempts to 
suggest a different approach, based on the monopolist insight of 
copyright.  
On the Continent, particularly in copyright systems, the first model 
of copyright as property has had several undesirable effects. The 
vision of copyright as a monopoly, instead, may appear a 
provocateur when visited upon the Italian system, but it has its 
historical and economic foundations within. Furthermore, the same 
Court of Justice of the European Union, although remaining 
consistent with the idea of property on lexical grounds, also affirms 
the crucial principles that copyright must be balanced with other 
equally important fundamental rights, such as the freedom to 
conduct business, the right of information and of privacy. 
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Such a balance, however, cannot be fully understood and fulfilled 
without granting adequate attention to the monopolistic substance 
of exclusivity, the latter being the key element of copyright. Only 
careful attention to the consequences that monopoly projects on the 
public interest for the progress of knowledge may effectively lead to 
the fair balance that is so frequently evoked.  
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